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1 Introduction
One feature of recent civil wars that has drawn much attention is the participation of
children (people under 18 years of age) as combatants. In 1998 it was believed that
over 300,000 children were involved in civil conﬂicts (Brett and McCallin, 1998). No
comprehensive estimate has been made since then.
The practice of recruiting minors for military service has met with concern and
protest by the international community. Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, an
amendment which went into eﬀect in 1979, states the following:
The parties to the conﬂict shall take all feasible measures in order that chil-
dren who have not attained the age of ﬁfteen years do not take a direct part
in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into
their armed forces.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), signed a decade
later, contains a nearly identical stipulation. An optional protocol on the involvement
of children in armed conﬂicts was added to the CRC in 2002, raising the age limit
from ﬁfteen to eighteen.
That same year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) declared that conscript-
ing children under the age ﬁfteen was a war crime. So far, however, only six people
have been convicted, all in Sierra Leone.
Non-governmental organizations have also reacted. In 1998 several of them,
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, formed the Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, an advocacy group.
Scholars from various ﬁelds  political science, law, psychology, but not yet
economics  have addressed the issue of child soldiering. They discuss the motives
and methods of child recruitment, as well as the rehabilitation prospects for former
child soldiers. Their studies oﬀer valuable insights, but lack a theoretical framework
which might be used to predict the consequences of policies, events or trends. My
paper's main objective is to provide such a framework.
The key decision-maker in such a model has to be the recruiter, not the child.
Most child soldiers are recruited by abduction or coercion. Those few who volunteer
could be turned away, but are not. Therefore the recruiter, whether he is a warlord
or an oﬃcer of a legitimate government army, makes a conscious decision whether
or not to have children in his army. For this reason, children will be treated in this
paper as resources rather than as decision-makers.
Warlords (as all recruiters will be called henceforth) do not recruit children out
of any particular desire to expose them to harm. They do so because it is conve-
nient. Children are more malleable than adults. They are more easily abducted and
drugged. If taken suﬃciently far away from their home, they have greater diﬃculty
ﬁnding their way back, and so may not even try. In other words, they are a low-cost
input. But any attempt to explain why children are recruited must begin with one
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simple fact: children would not be recruited if they could not get the job done. Their
eﬀectiveness as soldiers relative to that of adults is a key factor. The availability of
lightweight assault riﬂes has in recent times made this relative eﬀectiveness high.
Recruiting adults typically means taking them away from some productive ac-
tivity, such as farming. In many developing countries, the same is true of children.1
Recruitment of both adults and children, then, reduces local economic activity. But
it is control over this economic activity which is at stake in the conﬂict. This is
the familiar guns-and-butter tradeoﬀ: recruitment increases one's chances of ob-
taining the prize, but reduces the value of the prize. This tradeoﬀ was formalized
by Hirshleifer (1988) and forms the centerpiece of many conﬂict models published
afterward: for example, Garﬁnkel (1990), Hirshleifer (1991), Powell (1993), Neary
(1997), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001). See Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007) for
an overview.
A complete model, then, must take into account what adult and child soldiers
could have produced had they not been recruited. That is to say, adult and child
productivities in civilian life play a role. By comparing children to adults, both as
soldiers and as laborers, we may begin to understand the incentives behind child
recruitment. And if we can understand these incentives, we may be better able to
design policies to stop this recruitment from taking place.
In the model, two warlords face each other in a guns-and-butter conﬂict, with
the following elements: (i) each warlord has a pool of adults and children from which
to recruit soldiers, who are paid a subsistence wage; (ii) all non-combatants produce
a single consumable good, the output, and are also paid a subsistence wage; (iii) war
is fought for control of the output.
Adult and child productivities (both military and civilian), together with wages,
determine the recruiting strategies used by warlords, i.e. whether they will hire
adults or children, and how many of each. It will be seen that some specialization
always takes place, i.e. that one age group (adults or children) is employed exclusively
in that activity (soldiering or civilian production) for which it has a comparative
advantage. The likelihoods of the various scenarios are discussed in light of the known
characteristics of modern weapons and of the countries where civil wars have occurred
in recent times. In this way the model may help explain why child recruitment takes
place in some countries but not in others.
There are major simpliﬁcations here. We know that children do not abruptly
become adults at age 18 or at any other age: in terms of productivity and subsistence
requirements the change is gradual. There is not a single non-military industry, but
several. Moreover, war is complex, civil war particularly so. Many of its features
have been left out deliberately. Foreign intervention or inﬂuence is not modeled. Nor
do I allow for any reticence from using child soldiers on moral or political grounds.
1In fact, the age at which adulthood begins is contested on that account. In Africa, people are
sometimes considered adults at age 14, because that is when they are expected to begin working
(Wessells, 2006).
3
There is no distinction between governments and insurgents. I model each military
leader as a pure homo economicus, a rent-seeker. Some might say the motive for war
is often ethnic, religious or ideological  politics by other means  but I believe
that at bottom there is always an economic dimension.
Because of this economic dimension and in spite of the omissions it was necessary
to make, I think the model can tell us some important things about the recruitment
of children: the relative importance of the factors which make them valuable as
combatants (high productivity and low cost), and the need to know how children
perform in other activities. In other words, the model can help us understand how
children, as factors of production, inﬂuence the tradeoﬀ between war and production.
In addition to the works already mentioned, other relevant literature will be
introduced when relevant throughout the rest of the paper.
2 The Model
The model depicts an episode of appropriative conﬂict. At ﬁrst I model a symmetric
conﬂict between two warlords in identical environments. Subsequently I consider the
case where two warlords recruit individuals from two diﬀerent economic environments
(say, one urban and the other agrarian).
The population is divided into two groups, each controlled by one warlord. Each
group is composed of A adults and C children. Children here are deﬁned as indi-
viduals under the age of 18, old enough to work or ﬁght, but less productive than
adults generally.
There are two occupations: soldiering and a non-military productive activity,
which I call farming for simplicity. Adults and children are not decision-makers in
this model. Their participation in either warfare or farming can be secured by paying
them a ﬁxed wage, wA for adults and wC for children. This should be understood as
the cost of feeding the individual, as well as training and outﬁtting him for the work
in question, soldiering or farming, as the case may be. In modern civil wars, many
soldiers, particularly children, are actually coerced into ﬁghting.
Formally, each warlord i raises an army composed of Ai adult soldiers and Ci
child soldiers. These choices are subject to availability; that is to say, we must
have Ai ≤ A and Ci ≤ C. Eﬀectiveness in combat is given by two productivity
parameters: φAS and φCS. These parameters operate linearly, so that warlord i's
eﬀective ﬁghting strength is
Si = φASAi + φCSCi . (1)
Basically the parameters φAS and φCS are used to tally eﬃciency units of labor in
warfare. Thus a child on the battleﬁeld is equivalent to a fraction φCS/φAS of an
adult. The parameters do not directly express any notion of marginal contribution
to output, because output in war is not the same thing as in other activities.
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In the economics of conﬂict, resources used in warfare do not produce goods, but
rather help the spender appropriate goods which already exist or are produced by
others. This is a form of rent-seeking. To characterize how recruitment contributes
to a warlord's payoﬀ, we must invoke a technology of conﬂict, a function which
translates both sides' recruitment decisions into a military outcome. Let us say,
then, that warlord i's probability of winning the war is
Pi =
Si
S1 + S2
. (2)
In other words, it is the ratio of his own ﬁghting strength to the total ﬁghting strength
deployed. If no soldiers are recruited on either side, this fraction is assumed to be
one half. The right-hand side of (2) is a contest success function, a standard way to
model the outcome of conﬂicts, pioneered by Tullock (1980). This is a simple form
of it, weighted by productivities; see Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007) for an overview
of the several variations commonly used.
Individuals who do not become soldiers automatically become farmers. In the
farming sector, adults have productivity φAF and children have productivity φCF .
These are also linear operators, so that group i's farming output is
Hi = φAF (A−Ai) + φCF (C − Ci) . (3)
Net output is computed by subtracting wages from this:
H˜i = (φAF − wA)(A−Ai) + (φCF − wC)(C − Ci) . (4)
Total net output H˜1 + H˜2 is the only thing of real value in the economy; in a
sense it is the economy. Consequently it is over this that the war is fought. Warlord
i's expected payoﬀ can be written as
pii = Pi (H˜1 + H˜2)− wAAi − wCCi . (5)
The last two terms are the wages paid to adult and child soldiers respectively. They
must be paid by the warlord regardless of the outcome of the conﬂict, so they are not
multiplied by the probability of victory. Warlord i chooses Ai and Ci to maximize
pii, taking Aj and Cj as given (j 6= i) and subject to the constraints 0 ≤ Ai ≤ A and
0 ≤ Ci ≤ C. Equation (5) exempliﬁes the tradeoﬀ between military and productive
activities during war. The more resources one devotes to ﬁghting, the higher one's
chances of winning (higher Pi), but the lower the value of the prize (lower Hi).
The foregoing equations imply a certain timing of events for logical consistency:
warlords recruit, then economic activity (farming) occurs, then the output accrues
to the winner of the war. This is consistent with reality: war is a fairly protracted
event, so that by the time the issue of a conﬂict is settled, a substantial amount of
non-military economic activity has taken place. Mathematically nothing is lost in
assuming that these events all take place within a single period.
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2.1 Equilibrium
The relative values of the model's parameters (A, C, wA, wC , φAS, φCS, φAF and φCF )
will determine the structure of equilibrium. Before begining the analysis, however,
I wish to rule out the two extreme outcomes: total peace and total war.
Total peace is a situation where there are no soldiers on either side. In that case,
farming output is quite high, and each warlord can expect one half of it. This is the
most eﬃcient outcome possible, but it is not an equilibrium. If one of the warlords
were to raise even a very small army, farming output would go down a little bit, but
that warlord would get all of it, not just one half. This is a clear gain for him over
the preceding outcome. Therefore total peace cannot be an equilibrium.
Total war is the opposite situation, in which all individuals become soldiers.
Here there is no farming ouput, and so each warlord's payoﬀ is zero. The parties
ﬁght over nothing. Either warlord can make his payoﬀ positive by recruiting fewer
individuals, thereby allowing some farming to take place. Therefore total war is not
an equilibrium either.
Equilibrium is found by looking at the net marginal value of hiring adult and
child soldiers, i.e. the derivatives of pii with respect to Ai and Ci. These are
dpii
dAi
=
∂Pi
∂Ai
(H˜1 + H˜2) − (φAF − wA) Pi − wA ; (6)
dpii
dCi
=
∂Pi
∂Ci
(H˜1 + H˜2) − (φCF − wC) Pi − wC . (7)
Equilibrium is necessarily symmetric, with A1 = A2 and C1 = C2. Using these
equalities and the deﬁnition of Pi, equations (6) and (7) become
dpii
dAi
=
(
φAS
2
)(
H˜i
Si
)
−
(
φAF + wA
2
)
; (8)
dpii
dCi
=
(
φCS
2
)(
H˜i
Si
)
−
(
φCF + wC
2
)
. (9)
The derivative dpii/dAi must be zero if adults are to participate in both soldiering
and farming; it can only be negative if no adults are recruited, and positive if all
adults are recruited. The same logic applies to dpii/dCi in the case of children.
Inspection of (8) and (9) reveals that an interior solution, in which both deriva-
tives are equal to zero, can only occur if φCS/φAS = (φCF + wC)/(φAF + wA), This
will not be the case in general; in fact, for convenience, I will assume it does not
hold. We must therefore look for corner solutions. A corner solution is one in which
at least one of the two age groups, adults or children, is engaged exclusively in one of
the two activities, either soldiering or farming. In other words, some specialization
takes place.
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scenario parameter values who is recruited?
0 < Ai < A some adults1 φCF + wC
φAF + wA
<
φCS
φAS
< γ
(A
C
)
Ci = C all children
Ai = 0 no adults2 φCF + wC
φAF + wA
≤ γ
(A
C
)
≤ φCS
φAS Ci = C all children
Ai = 0 no adults3 γ
(A
C
)
<
φCF + wC
φAF + wA
<
φCS
φAS 0 < Ci < C some children
0 < Ai < A some adults4 φCS
φAS
<
φCF + wC
φAF + wA
< δ
(A
C
)
Ci = 0 no children
Ai = A all adults5 φCS
φAS
≤ δ
(A
C
)
≤ φCF + wC
φAF + wA Ci = 0 no children
Ai = A all adults6 δ
(A
C
)
<
φCS
φAS
<
φCF + wC
φAF + wA 0 < Ci < C some children
Table 1. Correspondence between parameter values and occupations of adults
and children in equilibrium.
Total peace and total war have already been ruled out. There remain six possibil-
ities. These are outlined in Table 1 and detailed in the appendix. The two constants
that appear therein are deﬁned as follows:
γ ≡ φAF − wA
φAF + wA
; δ ≡ φCF + wC
φCF − wC . (10)
The six scenarios cover all possibilities. Equilibrium always exists and is always
unique. So if we know how the parameters are related to each other, we can identify
the appropriate scenario and equilibrium conﬁguration.
Some important results emerge from the analysis. These are stated without
formal proofs, since they are taken almost directly from the table.
Proposition 1. Children will be recruited if
φCS
φAS
>
φCF + wC
φAF + wA
. (11)
The left-hand side of (11) is the child-to-adult productivity ratio in the military.
It is, more speciﬁcally, the adult equivalent of a child soldier. The right-hand side is a
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wage-adjusted productivity ratio for the farming sector. Basically this ratio compares
the marginal beneﬁts of taking a child and an adult out of the army and setting them
up as farmers. Wages ﬁgure positively in this accounting, since the warlord pays a
soldier with certainty but receives the net product of a farmer (productivity minus
wage) only with probability Pi (equal to one half in equilibrium).
The signiﬁcance of the result is that the recruitment of children occurs not just
because it is less costly to recruit a child than an adult (wC compared to wA). It
depends fundamentally on how well a child can do a soldier's job (φCS compared
to φAS), and how well he can do other jobs (φCF compared to φAF ). In essence,
the proposition states that children will be recruited if they have a comparative
advantage in soldiering.
Note also that the parameters A and C play no part in this result. We will
see below that A and C inﬂuence the degree to which child recruitment occurs, i.e.
whether all or only some of the children are recruited; but if (11) holds, then children
will be recruited regardless of population ﬁgures.
Proposition 2. All children will be recruited if (11) holds and
γ
(A
C
)
>
φCF + wC
φAF + wA
. (12)
The left-hand side of (12) is the adult-to-child population ratio, multiplied by
a constant. All other things being equal, children are more likely to specialize in
soldiering if they are few in number.
Proposition 3. Armies will be composed exclusively of children if (11) holds and
φCS
φAS
> γ
(A
C
)
. (13)
Here we see another eﬀect of the population ratio, namely that an abundance of
children may crowd adults out of the military.
These results concern scenarios 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1. For reasons which will be
explained shortly, scenarios 5 and 6 are not very realistic. That leaves scenario 4 as
the main case without child recruitment. In the following section, I will attempt to
establish links between these algebraic inequalities and real conﬂicts.
2.2 Assault riﬂes, population pyramids, and diamonds
Proposition 1 identiﬁes the condition which leads to child recruitment. This is con-
dition (11), which makes use of all four productivity parameters and both wages. To
my knowledge there do not exist reliable estimates for any of these. Nevertheless,
several factors lead me to conjecture that (11) does hold in many countries.
In most civilian economic activities in which children participate, children are
usually given the easiest jobs. But the easiest jobs are generally not the ones which
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generate the most revenue. So the value-added of child labor is much lower than that
of adults, who beneﬁt from greater physical strength, endurance, and experience, and
can therefore do the more economically important work.
Throughout most of history, adults have held these advantages over children in
warfare as well. It may or may not have been deemed morally objectionable to send
children to war, but the question never really came up, since children were simply
unable to perform the tasks required of a soldier. In recent times, however, the gap
between adult and child eﬀectiveness in soldiering has been closed considerably, due
to advances in weapons technology and the changing nature of war itself.
By far the most important change has been the development and large-scale
manufacture of assault riﬂes such as the AK-47 and the M16, particularly the for-
mer. These weapons are lightweight, easy to use, and deadly. Teenagers can handle
them almost as well as adults. Although designed and originally manufactured in
Russia, the AK-47 was not patented and has been freely copied. Finding out where
a particular AK-47 was made is virtually impossible. Furthermore, these weapons
have become more aﬀordable. In Africa, the purchase price of an AK-47 fell from
$235 in 1990 to $139 in 2000 (Killicoat, 2007).
Increasingly engagements are fought at close range, in urban or forested areas;
this makes the assault riﬂe the weapon of choice. Also, modern conﬂicts in developing
areas involve many confrontations between soldiers and civilians. These take the form
of raids, conducted by militias for the purposes of looting, punishing, or abducting
new recruits. Such raids can be entrusted to child soldiers, since they generally do
not involve an armed adversary.
The conjecture that (11) holds, at least in some countries, is supported by anec-
dotal evidence. Ishmael Beah, a former child soldier in Sierra Leone, recounted his
war experience in the book A Long Way Gone, published in 2007. Beah partook
in both farming and soldiering, and was able to gauge his performance relative to
adults in each of them. Prior to his becoming a soldier in the government army, he
was asked to help clear some land for the inhabitants of a village through which he
was passing. He wrote of the experience,
Gibrilla's uncle assigned each of us a portion of bush to be cut down. We
spent three days cutting down our portions. He was done in less than three
hours. (. . . ) I spent restless minutes swinging the cutlass with all my might
at trees that he would cut with one strike. (pp. 41-42)
Once he was recruited, he learned his new trade very quickly, to the point that
killing had become as easy as drinking water (p. 122). In some situations, Beah
explains, children actually had an edge over adults:
We went to work, killing everyone in sight. We didn't waste a single bullet.
We had all gotten better at shooting, and our size gave us an advantage,
because we could hide under the tiniest bushes and kill men who wondered
where the bullets were coming from. (p.143)
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Proposition 2 states that if (11) and (12) hold then all children will be recruited.
In reality it is never the case that all children are recruited. The correct interpretation
is that under those circumstances warlords will recruit as many children as they can.
In this they are limited by the number of children they can successfully abduct, the
number they consider ﬁt for soldiering, and the availability of weapons with which
to arm them.
To see if (12) holds, one needs to estimate the value of the constant γ and the
population ratio A/C. Let us deﬁne children as individuals under the age of 18
able to work or ﬁght, say all individuals aged 10 to 17. And let us deﬁne adults as
individuals who are 18 and over and able to work or ﬁght. This includes minimally
everyone aged 18 to 39.
The US Census Bureau has yearly population estimates for most countries, ar-
ranged by age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, and so on. Note that the 15-19 group contains
both children and adults. Therefore if we add the 10-14 and 15-19 groups together
for a given country in a given year, we get a number which overreports C. And if we
sum up the populations of age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39, we should get
a number which underreports A. Yet for the years 1990 to 2008 and the countries
where the use of child soldiers has been the most signiﬁcant (Afghanistan, Angola,
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda), there was not a single case in which the
former number exceeded the latter. This was true despite the fact that many of these
countries have very high percentages of youngsters in their population, relative to
other countries, due to birth rates in the vicinity of 4%. The population pyramid
for Sierra Leone in 1990 (the year in which the civil war began there) is shown in
Figure 1 by way of example.
There is strong evidence, therefore, that the ratio A/C is greater than 1. As
for γ, this is a number between 0 and 1. It measures, in a sense, the value to the
entrepreneur of using adult labor in the civilian activity. The more valuable the
output, over and above the wage paid to the laborer, the higher is γ. In an area
where agriculture is the main activity, γ is relatively low. But if labor is exploited
to extract a valuable natural resource, such as diamonds in Sierra Leone or coltan2
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, γ would be much closer to 1.
The other two ratios, φCS/φAS and (φCF +wC)/(φAF +wA), are clearly less than
1, since children are less productive than adults generally, and are less costly to
employ. When comparing these with γ(A/C), then, scenario 1 emerges as very likely
for resource-rich countries, particular if the extraction of the resource is physically
demanding and so generally left to adults.
Proposition 3 says that under some conditions armies will be made up of children
only. Naturally any real army will have a contingent of adults, at least enough to
oversee operations. Nonetheless, the proportion of children in some armies can be
2Coltan (columbite-tantalite) is a mineral used in the production of laptops, cell phones and
DVD players.
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Figure 1. Population pyramid for Sierra Leone at the outset of the
war. The distribution is heavily skewed towards low age groups, but
A/C is still greater than 1.
quite remarkable: according to some reports, children made up as much 70% of all
ﬁghting forces in Liberia's most recent civil war, 80% of the Revolutionary United
Front in Sierra Leone, and almost all of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda
(Singer, 2005).
The constant δ is greater than 1. Since, as I have argued, A/C is also greater
than 1, scenarios 5 and 6 are unrealistic.
2.3 Asymmetric equilibrium
Thus far I have assumed that the two groups ﬁghting each other are symmetric. For
this reason recruitment patterns were always the same on both sides. But a conﬂict
may arise between two dissimilar groups.
I have found that if the two groups diﬀer in size but not productivities, then
qualitatively the results will be the same as before.3 In particular, if (11) holds, all
children in both groups will be recruited.
What could bring about an asymmetry in recruitment is a productivity diﬀerence
between the two groups. This would be the case if the two groups were habitually
(in peacetime) engaged in diﬀerent economic activities, for example if one of them
inhabits a rural area while the other is mostly city-based.
3This is true as long as the diﬀerence between group sizes is not too lopsided. If one local
population is greatly outnumbered by the other, that population's warlord will commit all his
resources (all children and adults) to war, since he has so much to gain and so little to lose.
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To examine this possibility, let us continue to assume that each group has A
adults and C children; that the parameters φAS, φCS and φAF are the same for both
groups; but that children's productivity in civilian life is φCF1 in the ﬁrst group and
φCF2 in the second, with φCF1 < φCF2 . Net output in group i becomes
H˜i = (φAF − wA)(A−Ai) + (φCFi − wC)(C − Ci) . (14)
All other elements of the model are the same.
Under these circumstances, it may be the case that one warlord decides to recruit
children while the other does not  all in the pursuit of self-interest. In one scenario,
warlord 1 recruits all children in his group, warlord 2 recruits no children at all, and
both warlords recruit some of the local adults. That is the equilibrium we obtain if
A > C and
φCF1 + wC
φAF + wA
<
φCS
φAS
<
φCF2 + wC
φAF + wA
. (15)
More details on this equilibrium appear in the appendix. Condition (15) explains
once again, this time with asymmetric adversaries, how comparative advantage leads
to specialization. Children in warlord 1's group have a comparative advantage in
soldiering, so he recruits them. Those in warlord 2's purview have an advantage in
civilian production, therefore they are left to perform that activity.
Despite the asymmetry in recruitment, the two warlords have equal ﬁghting
strengths in this equilibrium, i.e. S1 = S2. And consequently they have equal
expected payoﬀs, i.e. pi1 = pi2. Therefore group 2's higher civilian productivity does
not give it an advantage over group 1.
3 Policy
In 2007 the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) convicted four military leaders on
various charges, including child recruitment. Two more convictinos followed in 2009,
on similar charges. Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia, is still on trial at
the SCSL; he is charged with war crimes, including child recruitment, at the SCSL.
(SCSL 2007, 2008, 2009). Thomas Lubanga, leader of the rebel group Union des
patriotes congolais (UPC), is also on trial for child recruitment at the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague (ICC, 2009). However, given the pervasiveness
of child recruitment, these are very small steps. The very nature of war makes it
extremely diﬃcult to monitor compliance with international law and to identify and
apprehend oﬀenders. For this reason, eﬀorts to stop child recruitment through legal
action seem destined for limited and at best symbolic success.
If the international community wishes to stop the recruitment of children, it
needs to remove or at least decrease the incentives for armies and militias to recruit
them. In our model, this means changing the productivity parameters that warlords
take as given when deciding whom to recruit.
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3.1 Reducing child productivity in soldiering
Arms control is the most obvious and perhaps the only feasible way to aﬀect the
parameters φAS and φCS. By curbing the inﬂow of weapons to military groups,
one decreases those groups' eﬀectiveness in combat. The model makes some clear
predictions about the consequences of such a measure. [This discussion refers to the
symmetric model.]
Suppose that the current situation is scenario 1. Each side's army has
Ai =
φAS(φAF − wA)A − φCS(φAF + wA)C
2φASφAF
(16)
adult soldiers and C child soldiers, for a ﬁghting strength of
Si =
(φAF − wA
2φAF
)
(φASA+ φCSC) . (17)
If the nature of the embargo is to decrease both adult and child military productivity
in roughly the same proportions, so that the ratio φCS/φAS remains essentially un-
changed, then the following will happen: ﬁghting strength Si will decrease on both
sides, from which we may expect a lower intensity of conﬂict; but the number of
adults and children recruited will remain the same as before.
It is relative productivity, i.e. the ratio φCS/φAS, which must be altered if any-
thing is to happen to recruitment. Let us suppose that a campaign to stop small arms
traﬃc is successful enough to produce a drop in φCS/φAS. The question is whether
this ratio decreases enough, i.e. whether it falls below (φCF + wC)/(φAF + wA) or
remains above it. If it remains above it, then the eﬀect of the change will be to
decrease each side's ﬁghting strength Si, increase adult recruitment, and leave child
recruitment the same. This is a logical outcome: children continue to have a com-
parative advantage in soldiering, so they are all recruited; because of the change in
productivity, each child can do less than before; to compensate, warlords hire more
adults.
To make any impact on child recruitment, it is necessary to bring φCS/φAS down
until (11) no longer holds. When this is done, child recruitment will fall to zero.
Adult recruitment will increase, as warlords substitute older soldiers for younger
ones. A rather aggressive initiative on small arms control would be needed. Unfor-
tunately, small arms are the most diﬃcult to control. Because of their size, they
are easily smuggled; and because of their simplicity, they can be produced cheaply
and discreetly, almost anywhere. The United Nations Programme of Action4 tries
to engage member states in such an eﬀort, but progress has been slow.
In addition to tracking new weapons, managing existing stocks is essential. In
1997, about 643,000 small arms disappeared from Albanian government stockpiles
4The full name is Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects (UN Document A/CONF.192/15).
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(Small Arms Survey, 2002). After the fall of the Hussein government in Irak in
2003, between 7 and 8 million small arms were looted from the government arsenal
(Small Arms Survey, 2004). Other sizeable transfers of this sort have been reported
in Russia, Uganda, Somalia, and eleswhere. Most of these weapons probably entered
the international black market very quickly.
3.2 Some remarks on child labor bans
One of the built-in assumptions of this model is that children will be employed no
matter what. They will be either soldiers or civilian workers. A richer model might
oﬀer them a third activity, namely education. But schoolchildren contribute very
little to civilian output in the short run. So according to the logic of this model,
they would be prime targets for forced recruitment. This has in fact been observed:
Brett and McCallin (1998) speak of recruitment raids in Myanmar schoolyards.
The surest way for a child to avoid direct participation in war is to be more
productive in something else. In this light, civilian child labor, being the lesser of
two evils, has its attractive side.
Movements to ban child labor in all its forms have received mixed responses
from the academic community. Scholars agree with the overall intent of the ban's
advocates, but caution that the possible consequences of such a policy should be
carefully studied before it is implemented. Basu and Van (1998) show that a ban on
child labor, because of its eﬀect on household incomes, could make children worse oﬀ.
Basu (1999) reviews other arguments against a ban raised in the literature. Dessy
and Pallage (2005) point out that a ban on harmful child labor (what the ILO calls
the worst forms of child labor) would cause children to switch to non-harmful labor,
thereby lowering the wage in that sector and possibly causing an overall decrease in
welfare.
This paper provides a diﬀerent warning. A ban on child labor would reduce
φCF dramatically. This could aﬀect what happens to children if war breaks out. If a
country has developed an industry in which children are highly productive, then that
country might be in scenario 4 at the onset of war, provided there is no ban on child
labor. Condition (11) would not be satisﬁed, and children would not be recruited.
But if there is a ban, the country will assuredly ﬁnd itself in scenario 1, 2 or 3. Thus
a ban on child labor might, quite inadvertently, contribute to the problem of child
soldiering. Children who could have worked in civilian production become soldiers
instead. Since soldiering is probably the worst form of child labor, the switch occurs
in the opposite direction as that considered by Dessy and Pallage. Could the ban be
abandoned in wartime? At that point it might be too late to reintroduce children
to the industry, because of the training and equipment involved.
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4 Conclusion
From an economic standpoint, civil war is a struggle to control a country's domestic
product. But war also diverts resources away from production. This is the essential
tradeoﬀ of conﬂict. In this model, adults and children are considered inputs in both
production and war. In that light, the decision whether to recruit adults or children
as soldiers is a managerial one, based on the two age groups' productivities in both
sectors.
I ﬁnd that if children have a comparative advantage in soldiering, i.e. if their
productivity relative to that of adults is higher in soldiering than in civilian pro-
duction (adjusting for wages), then there will be child recruitment. Putting an end
to the recruitment of children is therefore a matter of removing their comparative
advantage in soldiering. Controlling the traﬃc of small arms, though admittedly a
diﬃcult proposition, could produce dramatic results in the right direction. However,
a ban on child labor may actually give children a comparative advantage in soldiering
where none existed before.
Appendix A: Symmetric equilibrium
The following identiﬁes the six corner solutions and the parameter ranges which
give rise to them. Since pii is strictly concave in (Ai, Ci), there cannot be multiple
equilibria. Proposition 1 follows from scenarios 1, 2 and 3. Proposition 2 follows
from scenarios 1 and 2. And Proposition 3 follows from scenarios 2 and 3.
Scenario 1: Suppose φCF+wCφAF+wA <
φCS
φAS
< γ
(
A
C
)
. Then equilibrium is given by:
Ai =
φAS(φAF − wA)A − φCS(φAF + wA)C
2φASφAF
; Ci = C . (18)
This satisﬁes dpii/dAi = 0, dpii/dCi > 0 and 0 < Ai < A.
Scenario 2: Suppose φCF+wCφAF+wA ≤ γ
(
A
C
)
≤ φCSφAS (with one strict inequality). Then
equilibrium is given by:
Ai = 0 ; Ci = C . (19)
This satisﬁes dpii/dAi ≤ 0 and dpii/dCi ≥ 0.
Scenario 3: Suppose γ
(
A
C
)
< φCF+wCφAF+wA <
φCS
φAS
. Then equilibrium is given by:
Ai = 0 ; Ci =
(φAF − wA)A − (φCF − wC)C
2φCF
. (20)
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This satisﬁes dpii/dAi < 0, dpii/dCi = 0 and 0 < Ci < C.
Scenario 4: Suppose φCSφAS <
φCF+wC
φAF+wA
< δ
(
A
C
)
. Then equilibrium is given by:
Ai =
(φAF − wA)A − (φCF − wC)C
2φAF
; Ci = 0 . (21)
This satisﬁes dpii/dAi = 0, dpii/dCi < 0 and 0 < Ai < A.
Scenario 5: Suppose φCSφAS ≤ δ
(
A
C
)
≤ φCF+wCφAF+wA (with one strict inequality). Then
equilibrium is given by:
Ai = A ; Ci = 0 . (22)
This satisﬁes dpii/dAi ≥ 0 and dpii/dCi ≤ 0.
Scenario 6: Suppose φCF+wCφAF+wA <
φCS
φAS
< γ
(
A
C
)
. Then equilibrium is given by:
Ai = A ; Ci =
φCS(φCF − wC)C − φAS(φCF + wC)A
2φCSφCF
. (23)
This satisﬁes dpii/dAi > 0, dpii/dCi = 0 and 0 < Ci < C.
Appendix B: Asymmetric equilibrium
Here I describe only the equilibrium mentioned in Section 2.3. There are many other
possibilities. The condition A > C mentioned in the text is stronger than necessary
and used for brevity.
Suppose that (15) holds and that
2
(A
C
)
> γ
(φCS
φAS
)
+
(φCF2 − wC
φAF + wA
)
. (24)
Then in equilibrium
A2 =
(φAF − wA) (2φASA+ φCSC) + φAS(φCF2 − wC)C
4φASφAF
; (25)
A1 = A2 −
(φCS
φAS
)
C ; (26)
C1 = C ; C2 = 0 . (27)
This satisﬁes dpii/dAi = 0 and 0 < Ai < A for both values of i, as well as dpi1/dC1 > 0
and dpi2/dC2 < 0.
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